Industrial Warfare 2.0: Precision, Production, and the Return of Strategic Mass

Where Mass and Relative Superiority Meet Technical Innovation

In 1991, when America steamrolled the fifth largest military in the world in 100-hours some believed the American Way of War had changed to allow a commander to use an economy of force and achieve his (because they were all men) objectives. This was reinforced by the use of small teams of CIA and Special Forces to overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 and the thunder run to Baghdad in 2003. Technological superiority and precision were the core pillars of the Global War on Terror. The normal military gallows humor would refer to goal of some counterterrorism operations as “warheads on foreheads.”

We, the American led West, moved beyond the industrial-era model of mass production. Precision-guided munitions, networked warfare, and high-tech platforms made traditional mass, how much stuff and people you could send into the fray, irrelevant. However, the principles of war don’t change. Only the character. The war in Ukraine proves this. Interstate war, to what should be noone’s surprise, still demands large-scale production. The change we missed when abandoning our military principles was that mass through precision weapons, would be what carries many battles.

The Ukraine War is a case-study in the need for modern militaries to be able to sustain massed precision strikes as a core battlefield tactics. This war has become a race not just for battlefield advantage but for industrial output, supply chain resilience, and adaptability in weapons manufacturing.

War Still Demands Large-Scale Production

Since 20017, the U.S. Army and Joint Force have, slowly, adopted Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) and Multi-Domaine Combat (MDO) concepts as the new “way of American Warfare.” This doctrine seeks enable commanders in layer effects from troops, fires, cyber, electronic warfare, and space, hence MDO, across large formations engaged in WWII styles maneuver warfare in the hopes of forcing an enemy into a decisive battle.

To me, that is a foolish plan based off a poor study of history. The Ukraine War devolved not into WWII tactics but WWI trench and artillery warfare. But, the military has always been good at preparing for the war it wants and not the one it will fight and Western militaries have a tendency to watch other nations fight and say “oh but our elan and capabilities will carry the day differently.” Despite the hubris, the core requirement for modern warfare is, stuff. You need to be able to make weapons that can destroy the enemy’s stuff and make them fast enough to keep pace. Because, as Reuters reported, “When Ukraine was firing 10,000 [artillery] shells per day, between 35 and 45 Ukrainian soldiers were killed daily and about 250 to 300 were wounded. But when the daily fire fell to half that, more than 100 Ukrainian soldiers were killed per day and at least a thousand were wounded.” The volume of fire is a protection for troops. One of the core lessons should be that the U.S. needs to produce more stuff, precision fires, drones, and guided munitions, a lot more.

The Return of the King of Battle - Artillery

The proliferation of precision weapons, first person view (FPV) one way drones, highly accurate artillery and rockets, and the emergency of underwater unmanned vessels (UUV) Ukraine and Russia combine to expend tens of thousands of artillery shells per day and the number of rounds fired has a significant impact. Russia has relied on sheer volume, while Ukraine has used Western precision rounds (Excalibur, BONUS, PGK, etc.) to compensate for lower supply. However, to proliferation of Russian Electronic Warfare does impact thise rounds. The numbers show the U.S. that even if they produce 100,000 artillery rounds a month, in a large scale conflict that would be 10 days worth of artillery, tops. Palmer Luckey, Anduril’s founder, recently told Shawn Ryan the U.S. projects it runs out of munitions in eight days during a hypothetical war with China. The U.S. needs industrial-scale production of advanced and less-advanced munitions to sustain high-intensity combat.

Precision and Range

Russia’s approach for most of the war has been 20th century industrial warfare. As Stalin said, “quantity has a quality of its own.” Ukraine on the other hand, as the smaller nation, with less infantry, has creatively employed drones, western HIMARS and ATACMS, limited air power achieve effects. They have demonstrated that precision strikes can shape the battlefield but these systems are only created sustained effects if stockpiles are robust. To replace a lack of high-tech weapons Ukraine, and Russia, are increasingly using thousands of FPV drones for strikes and reconnaissance missions. Just a terrorist turned the vehicle borne improvised explosive device into a poor man’s GPS guided bomb, Russia and Ukraine are making large and small drones capable of destroying larger and more expensive equipment for a fraction of the cost. This is an innovation the U.S. can and should adopt now and learn how to employ in our formations today. Ukraine is able to rapidly build these drones and employ them at scale. Through, they do suffer from Russian EW and counter-drone capabilities. The U.S. should be building a catalog of modular drones that can be used and fitted to multiple purposes. This issue is production and sustaining production in peace time. This requires investments today to build the factories and supply chains necessary for tomorrow’s fight.

The West’s Struggle to Scale Up Precision Production

In 2011, Marc Andreesen said “Software is eating the world.” And it is, low CAPEX, high margin companies are able to make high profits, drive economic growth, and pay investors handsome dividends. What it will not do, is destroy armored formations. The U.S. economy, propelled by our tech sector is dynamic and a major edge. That edge might not be enough against a country able and willing to produce the tools of war at scale. The U.S. and Europe face major hurdles in ramping up production to supply Ukraine. The conflict has exposed deep weaknesses in Western defense industrial capacity and willingness to adjust entitlement spending and prioritize defense. This is particularly damning when it comes to sustaining precision weapons stockpiles.

Dumb Design Plans

The lack of planning and foresight in America’s unipolar moment is astounding. Many of our precision munitions, like the Javelins, Stingers, HIMARS rockets we supplied to Ukraine, were never designed for high-intensity, long-duration warfare. Which is weird, because they were developed to fight the Soviets and I am pretty sure we thought that would be a bit of a slog. Some of these systems take years to produce in meaningful numbers. Which means, in the next war, unless we fix the supply chains and production capabilities today, we have what we have. Again, our Peace Dividend in the 1990s and the forced consolidation of the 51 defense primes into the big five is the culprit here. The “end of history” was something we welcomed and rapidly dismantled much of our Cold War production capability.

Russia’s Adaptation

Russia is doing exactly what Russia did in WWII. They started with an invasion, took a massive shot on the chin, and are now the grind phase. From the outset, Ukraine resisted valiantly and the West quickly mobilized (quick for politicians) and put sanctions in place. A note, the sanctions took two years in some cases to fully trigger and the Trump Administration was able to threaten greater sanctions during their first month so they could not be that full. Despite those sanctions, Russia has grown its weapons production through industrial adaptation, use of older Soviet stocks, and external support (Iranian Shahed drones, North Korean artillery shells, North Korean soldiers). The U.S. needs to build this surge capacity in its defense industries now.

China: The Future Threat?

China’s eyes are on Ukraine, but also on U.S. production capabilities. China is investing heavily in industrial warfighting capabilities and is reportedly able to mass produce drones, missiles, and ships at a pace that far outstrips the U.S. Deterrence would not need strict numerical superiority to win, so long as the prize is less valuable than the risk China might resist a roll of the iron dice. A strategy of denial requires production today.

Toward a Model of Industrial Precision Warfare

Future interstate conflicts will be defined by who can produce precision mass at scale the fastest. This has major implications. First, exquisite capabilities are necessary but the bulk of procurement needs to shift from boutique crafts to mass produced precision. The U.S. must move away from small-batch, expensive systems toward mass-producible, modular precision weapons. Tomahawk cruise missiles are great, but also are expensive and hard to build. There was much clutching at pearls when Centrsl Command yeeted a batch of them at the Houthis in January 2024. (I assume yeet is used properly here.) A weapon that is too expensive or hard to replace is a useless weapon. Decentralizing weapons production and supporting commercial solutions to military problems is a key. The DOD has shifted to multi year munitions contracts in response to the need to increase production but the strategy is untested.

The New Industrial Arms Race

The war in Ukraine is not just about battlefield tactics. Over the long term, it is a test of who can sustain the fight. The U.S. focus on economy of force as an alternative to mass is not suited for this type of fight. We now require mass production and the quality that comes from it. We should not abandon high technology production, but must balance the exquisite with the necessary. The U.S. needs drones, anti-tank weapons, and long range missiles and their supply chains and production capabilities now for a future fight.