McRaven’s Special Operations Theory Revisited

Applying the Theory to Modern War

Admiral William McRaven is known for many things. Famously, he makes his bed. He also led U.S. Special Operations Command during the Bin Laden raid. However, before any of that, he was a young commander (O-4 in the Navy, equivalent to a Major in the Army) attending the Naval Postgraduate School, where he wrote A Theory of Special Operations.

Book Cover from Amazon

His thesis was later expanded into a book of the same name. The book examines seven special operations missions conducted between 1940 and 1976, analyzing Israeli, British, German, and U.S. operations. From these case studies, McRaven developed a definition of special operations and identified the core principles that successful missions share.

McRaven’s Definition of Special Operations

A special operation is conducted by forces specially trained, equipped, and supported for a specific target whose destruction, elimination, or in the case of hostages, the rescue of, is a political or military imperative.

Special operations challenge one of Clausewitz’s core maxims: that the defense is inherently stronger, requiring an attacker to muster superior force to succeed. Special operations forces, by their selective nature, are numerically disadvantaged. Instead of mass, McRaven argues that success comes from achieving relative superiority. Special Operations succeed by achieving a temporary tactical advantage over a fortified enemy. This advantage is gained through the principles of simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, and purpose.

McRaven’s Special Operations Model. Source: author’s photo

The Strengths and Limitations of McRaven’s Model

McRaven’s work is foundational but has been criticized within the special operations community for its narrow focus on raids. Critics argue that his model underemphasizes other essential special operations missions, such as Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and reconnaissance. However, this exclusion makes sense within McRaven’s framework.

Reconnaissance, while critical, is generally a supporting function rather than an operational on to itself. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations, meanwhile, are not universally classified as special operations forces. Outside the U.S. Army, most other branches and allied nations categorize them separately. Even within the Army, the bulk of Civil Affairs forces reside in the U.S. Army Reserve.

Despite its narrow focus, McRaven’s definition is markedly clearer than the official 2014 Joint Publication 3-05 definition of Special Operations:

Special operations require unique modes of employment, tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment. They are often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically and/or diplomatically sensitive environments, and are characterized by one or more of the following: time-sensitivity, clandestine or covert nature, low visibility, work with or through indigenous forces, greater requirements for regional orientation and cultural expertise, and a higher degree of risk. Special operations provide joint force commanders (JFCs) and chiefs of mission with discrete, precise, and scalable options that can be synchronized with activities of other interagency partners to achieve United States Government (USG) objectives.

That is 94 rambling words that could have been replaced by “The joint chiefs cannot define a special operation mission but we know it when we see it.” It’s nearly triple the length of McRaven’s definition, though, in truth, they are both McRaven’s definitions as he was the commander of SOCOM in 2014 and would have had some input on the Joint Publication.

Most of the principles McRaven detailed are self-evident. I think that surprise is poorly understood. Sun Tzu conceptualized surprise as, “attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.” This was the true hallmark of each of McRaven’s case studies. Attacks were against positions away from front lines, manned by non-infantry forces, and/or considered safe. This is where modern special operations are at their best.

During the unipolar moment, as the U.S. adopted a global policing role, special operations became a low-cost solution to high-risk military operations. The use of SOF allowed the U.S. to achieve results, though not victory, with smaller forces. Counterterrorism missions in Iraq and Afghanistan relied on speed, surprise, and intelligence networks to dismantle terrorist organizations. In Syria, special operations forces partnered with Kurdish and Arab allies to defeat the Islamic State while also conducting raids in Yemen, Iraq, and, famously, Pakistan. While effective, these operations relied on U.S. airpower and technological superiority. This is an advantage we not long can take for granted.

The Future of Special Operations

Ukraine offers a glimpse into the future of special operations in large-scale warfare. Ukrainian commandos have conducted raids deep behind Russian lines in Crimea and Kursk, mirroring British SAS raids on Axis airfields in North Africa during World War II. The political objectives of these missions remain unclear, but their strategic impact was to force Russia to divert resources from the front. This demonstrates the enduring value of bold, unconventional action.

Special operations thrive on unpredictability. This is one reason the special operations soldiers are often seen as non-conformist malcontents. By striking where the enemy feels secure, they instill fear, disrupt planning, and force enemies to worry about their rears. This remains the essence of special operations and is something that the U.S. SOF needs to relearn.