Merry Christmas

And Happy Holidays

It’s been just over a year since I started writing regularly on Substack. Though I have not written half as regularly as I would like I’ve managed to produce 81 articles. More importantly, I feel like I have had the opportunity to become part of a community that write and discuss military affairs, defense technologies, national security, and random subjects that catch my eye. I was also grateful to connect with Jordan Schneider, Tony Stark, and Eric Robinson and launch the Second Breakfast podcast. Next year, expect more of the same.

Last night the U.S. Department of Defense released the Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments. This is an annual report due to Congress, and obviously the department is late. They released the 2025 report on December 23rd. My first take away is there is a concerted effort to separate Chinese actions prior to 2025 and the second Trump Administration. The executive summary makes calls out many actions from 2024, like Volt Typhoon. What is missing is any of China’s 2025 actions. The only mention of rare earths is in a section discussing directed-energy weapons. Which, given the global restriction the PRC announced and executed this year following U.S. tariffs, seems like a big section to leave out.

Additionally, there is some accepting PLA explanations that is odd. The report on Joint Sword 2024B states,

In mid-October 2024, the PLA conducted exercise JOINT SWORD 2024B around Taiwan, reportedly in response to President Lai’s National Day Speech. The Eastern Theater Command JOCC again led exercise operations, which were designed, in part, to test multi-domain collaboration and joint operational C2. Additionally, the exercise emphasized the PLA’s ability to coordinate military operations across multiple theaters and domains.

I would have rather this been explained as what it was: an attempt to coerce the Lai presidency and influence Taiwanese internal politics.

The most interesting sections are in the special topics section of the report. I quote both at length below.

Chinese commercial enterprises and research institutions continue to acquire components from U.S. suppliers to support their research and development of critical dual-use technologies including artificial intelligence, biotechnology, quantum technology, advanced semiconductors, and advanced energy generation and storage. Some Chinese commercial technology developers also receive investment from U.S. and other foreign investors. Many of these Chinese entities also maintain connections to PLA, military-civil fusion, or state-sponsored initiatives, increasing the risk that U.S. technologies and investment is providing strategic benefit to the Chinese military.

This is important and raises questions to why the U.S. would continue to supply high-bandwidth memory chips and other critical technologies to the PRC when we acknowledge they are using them for the development of dual-use technologies. While cutting off U.S. technologies would only slow and not stop PRC developments, this throws cold water on the idea that we can get the PRC “addicted” to our technology as a means of control in the medium to long term.

China believes the next revolution in military affairs will occur when militaries transition to “intelligentized” warfare and fully integrate artificial intelligence, big data, advanced computing, and other technologies into the joint force. The PLA is still developing the military theory, doctrine, and operational concepts for intelligentized warfare and continued experimenting with different AI-enabled capabilities and concepts throughout 2024. The PLA is studying Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and identifying transferrable lessons learned from both sides, including lessons related to the use of AI and unmanned systems which increasingly appear in PLA exercises and training.

This ties into the dual-use technology and the question of why we would continue supplying the PRC. If we acknowledge that the PRC is attempting to create AI-backed military decision-making to intelligentized warfare, why would we sell them the means to achieve that faster?

The report leaves a lot to be desired. Hopefully, next year’s report can answer some of these questions.