This brings to mind the Chinese military’s ongoing efforts to reconcile its traditionally centralized command structure with the principles of mission command.  
In recent years, the PLA has emphasized the need for subordinate initiative and flexibility, but its hierarchical structure and the dual-command system involving political commissars present challenges. To address this, the PLA is increasingly integrating AI into its C2 systems. AI-driven decision support tools are being developed to assist commanders in making more informed decisions, potentially compensating for gaps in officer experience and promoting more agile battlefield responses.  
These developments suggest a hybrid approach, blending traditional C2 structures with modern technologies to enhance decision-making and operational flexibility. Not sure if it’ll work, though. I’m guessing the theater JOCCs and even more so the CMC JOCC with Xi Jinping sitting in his CINC chair will micromanage any war from above. I write about PLA C4ISR on my Substack, if interested. https://ordersandobservations.substack.com
Really good article. I found myself pondering this thought. Don’t you dare tell me I’m wrong.
Seizing the initiative. Its significance has routinely been referenced by senior leaders every at echelon. It’s a lesson in every book, on every commanders reading list, and it’s consistently referenced in every update to the Army’s Operating Concept. History is full of examples of commanders seizing the initiative, and subsequently capitalizing on the momentum (Huns, Alexander the Great, Allied attack at Amiens, Patton’s Information Warfare in France, and Blitzkrieg) it created. However, contemporary examples of seizing the initiative lack the same results they once did (at scale). In recent conflicts, you can only find micro examples at the tactical and maybe the operational level, but nothing nearly as extraordinary (insert Ukrainian scenario). There are lots of reasons for it.
So, I wonder if we are overvaluing concepts like “initiative” simply because we can look at historical events and recognize the importance they once played, and assume they hold the same value in conflict today. It’s like other appealing factors in history like “audacity,” that was once extremely important. It’s certainly hard for me to connect the dots over the last twenty-five years. Conversely, if I wave the “I believe in our LSCO concept,” wand, it’s a bit easier to conceptualize (although perhaps counter-indicated in many LSCO scenarios).
I honestly think you are touching on something that is connected. Maybe the best example you didn’t list was Afghanistan, when Paul, Andy, and the rest were just making it up as they went along after meeting up with the Northern Alliance.
I wonder what truly bottom up initiative driven operations even exist from GWOT? Maybe the choice to assist the Kurds in Kobani despite handwringing at higher levels? I think the effort we have spent to have more robust command and control reduced the effects an individual had on the battlefield. This is also partly by design. Empowering subordinates is not without perils. As Karl would say, Lee did not want to fight at Gettysburg, but once his forward units were engaged, because everyone moved to the sound of the guns, he committed to fight. So, initiative can also backfire and that is why I think commanders want to control it. It’s fear.
This brings to mind the Chinese military’s ongoing efforts to reconcile its traditionally centralized command structure with the principles of mission command.  
In recent years, the PLA has emphasized the need for subordinate initiative and flexibility, but its hierarchical structure and the dual-command system involving political commissars present challenges. To address this, the PLA is increasingly integrating AI into its C2 systems. AI-driven decision support tools are being developed to assist commanders in making more informed decisions, potentially compensating for gaps in officer experience and promoting more agile battlefield responses.  
These developments suggest a hybrid approach, blending traditional C2 structures with modern technologies to enhance decision-making and operational flexibility. Not sure if it’ll work, though. I’m guessing the theater JOCCs and even more so the CMC JOCC with Xi Jinping sitting in his CINC chair will micromanage any war from above. I write about PLA C4ISR on my Substack, if interested. https://ordersandobservations.substack.com
Really good article. I found myself pondering this thought. Don’t you dare tell me I’m wrong.
Seizing the initiative. Its significance has routinely been referenced by senior leaders every at echelon. It’s a lesson in every book, on every commanders reading list, and it’s consistently referenced in every update to the Army’s Operating Concept. History is full of examples of commanders seizing the initiative, and subsequently capitalizing on the momentum (Huns, Alexander the Great, Allied attack at Amiens, Patton’s Information Warfare in France, and Blitzkrieg) it created. However, contemporary examples of seizing the initiative lack the same results they once did (at scale). In recent conflicts, you can only find micro examples at the tactical and maybe the operational level, but nothing nearly as extraordinary (insert Ukrainian scenario). There are lots of reasons for it.
So, I wonder if we are overvaluing concepts like “initiative” simply because we can look at historical events and recognize the importance they once played, and assume they hold the same value in conflict today. It’s like other appealing factors in history like “audacity,” that was once extremely important. It’s certainly hard for me to connect the dots over the last twenty-five years. Conversely, if I wave the “I believe in our LSCO concept,” wand, it’s a bit easier to conceptualize (although perhaps counter-indicated in many LSCO scenarios).
I honestly think you are touching on something that is connected. Maybe the best example you didn’t list was Afghanistan, when Paul, Andy, and the rest were just making it up as they went along after meeting up with the Northern Alliance.
I wonder what truly bottom up initiative driven operations even exist from GWOT? Maybe the choice to assist the Kurds in Kobani despite handwringing at higher levels? I think the effort we have spent to have more robust command and control reduced the effects an individual had on the battlefield. This is also partly by design. Empowering subordinates is not without perils. As Karl would say, Lee did not want to fight at Gettysburg, but once his forward units were engaged, because everyone moved to the sound of the guns, he committed to fight. So, initiative can also backfire and that is why I think commanders want to control it. It’s fear.