It's also very under-appreciated the extent to which President Bush and his senior team had spent basically their entire professional (political or military) careers building the types of networks uniquely valuable for this conflict.
We're in a moment when the American public broadly distrusts experts and seriously discounts experience, often IMO for good reasons. And the value experience isn't necessarily something you can elevate in the abstract today. But the more folks learned about the Gulf War, framed as in this post, it would do well to orient folks towards what real and valuable experience can do for folks in positions of leadership.
> There is a very real possibility that China will target U.S. staging and basing locations among its first targets should they attempt a military occupation of Taiwan. Why would they allow six months, or even six days, of build up on near their borders?
If China successfully invaded and occupied Taiwan in short order, the incentive after the fact would be for the US to not declare war. Should the US not be prepared to immediately support Taiwan or doesn't declare war immediately (which seems likely. Why declare war when that would encourage China to interfere with your preparations?), China might gamble on resolving the conflict before the US can intervene. The US felt confident in its ability to successfully invade Iraq, but I'm not so sure how it would see a retaking of Taiwan.
> China and Russia have developed layered strategies to target satellites, jam communication, spoof locations, and disrupt the data chains that modern U.S. depends on. And that is not allowing for disruptions to the U.S. homeland which is much more susceptible to these attacks because there is no market pressure currently to invest in costly backups as an insurance policy.
What do you think about Starlink? There's nearly 10,000 of these satellites in orbit right now, and the only limiting factor on connectivity and data speed are the number of users, which could quickly be limited to civilians during a conflict where this technology is necessary. They've proven useful in Ukraine, and besides initial Russian attempt to hack ground-based Starlink receivers, they haven't been able to jam them due to the sheer quantity necessary (and any ground based installation capable of jamming Starlink signal over a long area would be a very large, and very "loud" target for attack).
The tech seems to be only improving too. Now you can connect to Starlink with any new smartphone. I wouldn't be surprised if connectivity only get easier and more accessible, with militaries have 24/7 unjammable 4k connection to every solider and piece of equipment. Major weather reduces connectivity, though it doesn't eliminate it.
For China conducting strikes on the U.S. at the outset of a Taiwan invasion: There are always assumptions in this analysis. I think, the PLA has to treat it as a certainty if the U.S. has not openly declared they will not intervene. In particular. As the U.S. will likely face pressure from Asian allies and partners to act.
I think starlink is great. The Ukrainians are having to use techniques like burying the satellites to block them from ground based jamming and are constantly moving them when they transmit. The Navy demoting the Chief that snuck a starlink onto a ship to highlights the issue with giving away locations. Even if there are more connected devices in the future on a battlefield why would we expect all of those devices to remain once the cyber/space weapons and conventional explosions start?
I’m not very familiar with the INDOPACOM problem sets, but I routinely see smart folks overlay PRC capabilities against US/Coalition actions in Taiwan, and use it to determine our vulnerabilities. If we were to remove Taiwan from the equation, and insert a different country in the same AOR, does it change your calculus? Proximity is a big advantage for China in the Taiwan scenario, but if we were both playing the “away game?” For example, is GPS denial just as important if we are fighting over Singapore next year?
GPS denial only affects the U.S. and Europe to some degree. GPS works on L bands and military M bands (or code). The Chinese BeiDou system works on other bands and has more satellites in orbit and the ability to message within its satnav system. I would have to think more on what Chinese force project against a more distant location would look like and their inherent weaknesses. One of the things that makes Taiwan hard is that if the U.S. were to intervene but want to limit that intervention it would not want to attack the Chinese mainland. That makes Taiwan a worst case scenario for the U.S. to prepare against so using it as the yardstick makes sense to some degree.
It's also very under-appreciated the extent to which President Bush and his senior team had spent basically their entire professional (political or military) careers building the types of networks uniquely valuable for this conflict.
We're in a moment when the American public broadly distrusts experts and seriously discounts experience, often IMO for good reasons. And the value experience isn't necessarily something you can elevate in the abstract today. But the more folks learned about the Gulf War, framed as in this post, it would do well to orient folks towards what real and valuable experience can do for folks in positions of leadership.
Absolutely. There is also a very good lesson in the need for shared systems, knowledge, and technology across allies that is somewhat fracturing.
> There is a very real possibility that China will target U.S. staging and basing locations among its first targets should they attempt a military occupation of Taiwan. Why would they allow six months, or even six days, of build up on near their borders?
If China successfully invaded and occupied Taiwan in short order, the incentive after the fact would be for the US to not declare war. Should the US not be prepared to immediately support Taiwan or doesn't declare war immediately (which seems likely. Why declare war when that would encourage China to interfere with your preparations?), China might gamble on resolving the conflict before the US can intervene. The US felt confident in its ability to successfully invade Iraq, but I'm not so sure how it would see a retaking of Taiwan.
> China and Russia have developed layered strategies to target satellites, jam communication, spoof locations, and disrupt the data chains that modern U.S. depends on. And that is not allowing for disruptions to the U.S. homeland which is much more susceptible to these attacks because there is no market pressure currently to invest in costly backups as an insurance policy.
What do you think about Starlink? There's nearly 10,000 of these satellites in orbit right now, and the only limiting factor on connectivity and data speed are the number of users, which could quickly be limited to civilians during a conflict where this technology is necessary. They've proven useful in Ukraine, and besides initial Russian attempt to hack ground-based Starlink receivers, they haven't been able to jam them due to the sheer quantity necessary (and any ground based installation capable of jamming Starlink signal over a long area would be a very large, and very "loud" target for attack).
The tech seems to be only improving too. Now you can connect to Starlink with any new smartphone. I wouldn't be surprised if connectivity only get easier and more accessible, with militaries have 24/7 unjammable 4k connection to every solider and piece of equipment. Major weather reduces connectivity, though it doesn't eliminate it.
For China conducting strikes on the U.S. at the outset of a Taiwan invasion: There are always assumptions in this analysis. I think, the PLA has to treat it as a certainty if the U.S. has not openly declared they will not intervene. In particular. As the U.S. will likely face pressure from Asian allies and partners to act.
I think starlink is great. The Ukrainians are having to use techniques like burying the satellites to block them from ground based jamming and are constantly moving them when they transmit. The Navy demoting the Chief that snuck a starlink onto a ship to highlights the issue with giving away locations. Even if there are more connected devices in the future on a battlefield why would we expect all of those devices to remain once the cyber/space weapons and conventional explosions start?
I’m not very familiar with the INDOPACOM problem sets, but I routinely see smart folks overlay PRC capabilities against US/Coalition actions in Taiwan, and use it to determine our vulnerabilities. If we were to remove Taiwan from the equation, and insert a different country in the same AOR, does it change your calculus? Proximity is a big advantage for China in the Taiwan scenario, but if we were both playing the “away game?” For example, is GPS denial just as important if we are fighting over Singapore next year?
GPS denial only affects the U.S. and Europe to some degree. GPS works on L bands and military M bands (or code). The Chinese BeiDou system works on other bands and has more satellites in orbit and the ability to message within its satnav system. I would have to think more on what Chinese force project against a more distant location would look like and their inherent weaknesses. One of the things that makes Taiwan hard is that if the U.S. were to intervene but want to limit that intervention it would not want to attack the Chinese mainland. That makes Taiwan a worst case scenario for the U.S. to prepare against so using it as the yardstick makes sense to some degree.